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Harm Matters: Punishing Failed Attempts 
 
 
Richard L. Lippke 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For some time now, there has been a lively debate among legal scholars and 
punishment theorists about the sentences appropriate to certain kinds of failed 
criminal attempts.  The cases in question are contrived in ways to isolate the 
relevant issues.  Often, they involve crimes in which individuals form intentions to 
kill someone and undertake to do so.  They aim rifles at their intended victims and 
pull the triggers.  Some of them hit their intended targets; others shoot but the 
intended victim moves or a wayward breeze blows and the bullet whizzes on by.  
We are supposed to imagine, in the latter cases, that no further attempts are made 
before the police intervene and arrest the failed attempters.   
Many scholars, often termed “subjectivists,” insist that the agents in the two 
scenarios ought to be assigned the same sentences by the courts, although some 
completed homicides and others only attempted them.
1
  The successful and failed 
killers are alleged to be equally culpable—both had intentions to kill their victims 
and acted on them.  Only luck, a factor beyond the control of the respective agents, 
determined the different outcomes.  To simplify things, we are to imagine that the 
agents are the same in every other respect that might be thought relevant to 
sentencing.  Thus, things like an offender’s past criminal history—a significant 
sentencing factor in many legal jurisdictions—are to be held constant in the 
analysis of the two kinds of scenarios. 
Other scholars, often termed “objectivists,” argue that the harms actually done 
by the “successful” agents ought to be regarded as legitimate, independent factors 
in sentencing, such that the harm-causing agents should receive longer sentences 
than the agents who, luckily, did not cause harm.
2
  Objectivists often appeal to the 
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social fact of different emotional and behavioral reactions to the two kinds of 
agents.  Successful murder attempts produce considerable social anguish, grief, 
and resentment.  Failed attempts produce significantly less intense reactions of 
these kinds.  Also, failed attempters might come to view themselves as fortunate 
and feel great relief at not having actually caused the harm they intended.  
Successful attempters will or should feel differently about what they have done.  
These varied reactions to the ultimate outcomes are given weight by objectivists, 
who argue that they help to make sense of ubiquitous sentencing practices 
according to which failed attempters are thought to be deserving of less 
punishment than otherwise similar but successful ones.  
Like many of the subjectivists, I remain unpersuaded by appeals to our 
different emotional reactions to the two kinds of cases.  For what is there to 
convince us that these reactions are not, at bottom, simply irrational?  As some 
scholars have suggested, perhaps these reactions are driven by outcome bias, 
according to which we naturally, but illogically, attribute more culpability to 
agents who succeed in producing the harms at which they aim than do agents who 
fail to produce harm.
3
  At the very least, we might like to hear more about why 
such admittedly widespread emotional or behavioral reactions justify assigning 
different sentences to successful and unsuccessful attempters.  In particular, how 
does assigning them different sentences serve appropriate penal aims? 
My aim in what follows is to develop and defend an objectivist account that is 
different from those in the extant literature.  It is an account focused on the special 
significance of harm, and in particular, on its crucial role within what I believe is a 
plausible theory of sentencing.  In Part II, I briefly sketch this theory.  It is a 
version of negative retributivism according to which penal sentences aim to reduce 
crime within upper and lower proportionality limits that are keyed to victim harm.  
Importantly, I concede that these proportionality limits must be constructed in 
ways that reflect the culpability of offenders.  Intentional or deliberately inflicted 
harms are the most culpable and penal harms should take this into account; 
recklessly or negligently inflicted harms are less culpable and penal harms should 
be discounted accordingly.  Unlike many subjectivists, however, I contend that it is 
the harms typically wrought by criminal offenses, rather than offender culpability, 
which play the lead role in determining sentence ranges for core criminal offenses. 
In Part III, I examine the implications of the resulting account of sentencing 
for the debate about whether successful and failed attempters ought to be punished 
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differently.  My contention is that when harm does not eventuate from criminal 
attempts, the retributive component of a mixed sentencing theory, in the form of a 
principle requiring that proportional penal harms ought to be visited upon 
offenders, does not get activated.  Failed attempters have not inflicted harm; to 
then inflict penal harms on them proportional to the harms caused by successful 
attempters would be anomalous.  Instead, we punish failed attempts primarily to 
deter them or to incapacitate those who have undertaken them. 
In Part IV, I consider various objections to my account.  One common 
strategy of subjectivists is to focus on the equal culpability of successful and failed 
attempters.
4
  I argue that this misconceives the role of culpability in a theory of 
sentencing.  The harms done to victims or society are what ought to matter in 
determining criminal sanctions; culpability is a qualifying factor in sentencing—
nothing more.  I also argue against recent efforts by Larry Alexander and Kim 
Ferzan to denigrate the role of harm in our thinking about how to punish failed 
attempters.
5
  In the course of doing so, I discuss “impossible attempts” and their 
implications for the debate between objectivists and subjectivists.  
 
II. HARM MATTERS 
 
I begin with the proposition that it is harm to our vital interests, in various 
forms, that the criminal law seeks to prevent and, when it is wrought through 
culpable action, punish.  In many cases, these harms are individual in character—
loss of life, physical or psychological injury, or loss of or damage to property.  In 
other cases, the harms to be prevented by the criminal law are more indirect, as 
when the criminal law prohibits actions that contribute to aggregate harms, such as 
environmental degradation, or when it punishes actions that are contrary to 
mutually beneficial schemes of cooperation.  Of course, the criminal law prohibits 
and punishes not only actions that actually inflict harm, but ones that unreasonably 
risk it.  What the criminal law does not do is punish people merely for their 
malevolent intentions or earnestly hoped-for deadly or damaging outcomes.  
Individuals can spend their days beseeching the gods for suffering to be inflicted 
upon their enemies, or plotting elaborate schemes to exact revenge upon them, but 
such mental activities are not properly within the ambit of the criminal law unless 
they are manifested in one or more overt actions designed to unleash destructive 
forces in the world.  On this point, about the punishment of failed attempts, 
subjectivists and objectivists are presumably in agreement.  We should not punish 
people for bad intentions or bad characters, only for actions that cause or 
unreasonably risk harm.  
It will be useful in thinking about sentencing to begin with Andrew von 
Hirsch’s well-known account of legal punishment, according to which it has two 
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essential components: censure and hard treatment.
6
  It censures by communicating 
societal condemnation of prohibited acts.  This communicative message goes not 
only to offenders, who are deemed capable of grasping its stark assessment of their 
moral failings, but also to victims, who thereby see society standing for their 
interests, and the public, which is reminded of signally important limits on the 
actions in which they are permitted to engage.
7
  Von Hirsch interprets the censure 
element as retributive in character, insisting that it must be tailored to reflect the 
ill-deserts of offenders.  He construes hard treatment as primarily concerned with 
preventing future crimes.  On his account, legal punishment “speaks” to us both as 
moral creatures (through its censuring aspect) and as fallible moral creatures who 
might need the threat of some penal harm or setback to serve as a prudential or 
incapacitation backup.
8
   
There is much to admire in von Hirsch’s elegant blending of retributive and 
crime reduction aims to legal punishment, and I believe that a plausible theory of 
sentencing must blend them.  However, I interpret and blend them differently.  
Crime reductionists have long sought to make sense of legal punishment’s 
censuring aspect, interpreting it as a way of reinforcing vital moral norms against 
certain kinds of misconduct.
9
  By condemning criminal acts, legal punishment 
reminds each of us of the importance of these norms.  To the extent that this 
message is internalized, individuals refrain from harmful conduct all on their own, 
thus reducing the need for socially costly and individually damaging criminal 
sanctions.  
More importantly for my purposes, retributivists offer various accounts of 
why the hard treatment of offenders is justified.
10
  What these accounts share is the 
notion that censure is expressed through the imposition of hard treatment, which 
must be kept proportionate with the severity of crimes.  The severity of crimes is 
determined by the harms they cause (or perhaps risk) and the culpability with 
which agents act.
11
  Retributivists do not view hard treatment as a prudential 
supplement to censure; instead, they construe hard treatment as a vehicle for 
justice.  Also, on what I believe are the most convincing retributive accounts, hard 
treatment serves a kind of rough equalizing purpose.  Through their criminal 
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actions, offenders disrupt a normative status quo, inflicting unjustified injuries or 
losses on those who are their victims.  In response, legal punishment imposes 
proportional penal losses and disabilities on offenders.  Granted, it can do so, in 
some cases, simply by requiring offenders to act in ways to make their victims 
whole again.  Yet many of the harms wrought by criminal offenses—loss of life, 
permanent disability, degradation, loss of privacy, a diminished sense of security—
cannot be restored through financial or other compensation.  The only “equalizing” 
recourse is to impose proportionate penal harms on offenders. 
It will be useful, at this point, to introduce the distinction between ordinal and 
cardinal proportionality in order to clarify the retributive account of hard 
treatment.
12
  The former concerns the relative severity of penal harms: murderers, 
because they inflict the gravest of harms on their victims, must be punished more 
harshly than bank robbers or shoplifters.  Contriving a sanction scale so that it is 
ordinally proportionate, and thus reflective of the relative severity of the various 
criminal offenses, is challenging, but most penal theorists believe it is a challenge 
that can be met.
13
  Cardinal proportionality presents greater difficulties.  It 
concerns the absolute severity of the penal sanction scale—or what von Hirsch 
refers to as its “anchoring points”—and it is less clear whether there are widely-
shared intuitions about how harsh or mild sanction scales should be overall.
14
  
Indeed, it is apparent that different societies anchor their sentencing scales in 
various ways, with the United States scale at the harsh end of things, and 
Scandinavian countries at the milder end.
15
  Cardinal proportionality might place 
only very broad constraints on sentencing.  We might all agree that punishing 
shoplifters like murderers is not only ordinally unjust, but cardinally, or absolutely 
unjust.  Yet not all cases will be as easy as this one.  Hence, the most plausible 
interpretation of cardinal proportionality is one that permits some variability in the 
overall “punishment bite” of sentencing scales.  
Once it becomes apparent that retributive approaches do not have a monopoly 
on explaining how legal punishment censures, and that crime reduction approaches 
do not have a monopoly on explaining hard treatment, we are back to the drawing 
board, so to speak, in attempting to determine whether one of these approaches is 
preferable to the other, or whether we ought to combine them in some way.  For a 
variety of well-known reasons, I believe that the most defensible approach is to 
combine them in ways that yield a version of what is known as negative (or 
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limiting) retributivism.
16
  Negative retributivism embraces a crime reduction role 
for legal punishment, though one that is constrained by retributive considerations.  
As in familiar versions of the theory, there must be upper proportionality 
constraints on the severity of criminal sanctions that otherwise aim at reducing 
crime.  Presumptively, we should not inflict more than proportional penal harms 
on offenders even if crime reduction considerations would counsel us to do so.
17
  
Rather than casting this proportionality constraint as a mere stipulation limiting the 
pursuit of crime reduction aims, I contend that it is grounded in a commitment to 
keeping penal harms from exceeding the harms done to victims or society by 
criminal offenses.  In accordance with the rough equalizing aim of retributive 
penal logic, sanctions must be kept responsive to the gravity of the wrongdoing 
engaged in by offenders or else offender interests will be unjustly set back by 
criminal sanctions and thereby devalued.  Punishing burglars like rapists or 
murderers, for instance, inflicts penal losses and disabilities on burglars that are 
ordinally disproportionate given the harms typically caused by their respective 
crimes.  Also, depending on the severity of the sanctions imposed, they might turn 
out to be cardinally disproportionate, exceeding any plausible version of what 
burglars deserve given the harms typically wrought by their criminal actions.  
Further, we should opt for a version of negative retributivism that employs a 
retributive constraint at the lower end of the sentence ranges for crime types.  This 
means that even if crime reduction considerations would not, for some reason, 
require the infliction of proportional penal losses or disabilities on offenders of 
certain kinds, we must be prepared to impose them if considerations of 
proportionate penal harm require it.  Again, though a retributive account of hard 
treatment must be interpreted in ways that acknowledge the indeterminacy of 
cardinal proportionality, moderate to severe criminal offenses that harm victims 
substantially must be punished with sanctions that impose significant penal losses 
and disabilities on the person convicted of having committed them.  Just as legal 
punishment for offenses can be too harsh, by taking much more from offenders 
than they took from their victims, so it can be too mild by taking too little from 
offenders.  A large fine or a brief prison sentence for a crime as serious as 
intentional homicide, for instance, would sleight the grave harm to the victim.  
Indeed, I doubt that we can make sense of victim or survivor anguish and 
frustration with the criminal justice system in cases in which it fails to punish 
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serious wrongdoers proportionally with the gravity of their crimes without 
accepting the plausibility of a retributive element in sentencing.  One of the crucial 
things persons who are criminally harmed in significant ways by others want, or 
what their loved ones want, is justice, understood as proportionate punishment of 
those who committed severe wrongs; this is consistent, of course, with their also 
wanting punishment to deter or incapacitate.
18
   
Crime reductionists argue that we punish serious crimes more harshly in order 
to deter them or incapacitate those who commit them.  Perhaps, except that it is 
well-known that harsher sanctions are not strongly correlated with marginal 
deterrence.
19
  It seems doubtful that lengthy prison sentences are all that useful in 
deterring many would-be offenders, including would-be murderers.  Indeed, von 
Hirsch, who defends hard treatment primarily on preventive grounds, urges no 
more than five-year prison sentences for most deliberate homicides, precisely 
because of the dubious marginal deterrence effects of longer sentences.
20
  If we are 
to punish deliberate murderers more stoutly than von Hirsch proposes, as I believe 
that we should, something other than a deterrence rationale likely will be needed.  
In response, crime reductionists might champion incapacitation as the ground 
for longer sentences.  But many deliberate murderers, for instance, are probably 
not a danger to others, since they kill people close to them over personal conflicts 
that are unlikely to recur.
21
  Add to this the aging out effect, and lengthy sentences 
for serious crimes seems like a questionable crime reduction strategy if the costs 
and burdens of legal punishment are to be weighed against its benefits.
22
  Without 
a retributive sentencing element of the sort my version of negative retributivism 
incorporates, it will prove difficult to justify inflicting substantial penal losses and 
disabilities on offenders who have caused grave harm to their victims.  Longer 
sentences are needed in order to inflict proportionate penal losses on serious 
offenders and thereby afford justice to victims, not simply to reduce crime.   
Nonetheless, crime reduction considerations might figure in such a negative 
retributivist scheme in at least three different ways.  First, ordinal proportionality is 
consistent with having sentence ranges for offense types, thus leaving sentencing 
judges with some discretion in assigning sentences for offense tokens.
23
  Judges 
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should be permitted to assign sentences in the relevant ranges based on 
empirically-verified crime reduction considerations, such as the need to 
incapacitate certain offenders.  Second, given that cardinal proportionality is, at 
best, loosely constraining, there might be some role for crime reduction 
considerations to play in moving a sentencing scheme’s anchoring points upwards 
or downwards.  For instance, if offending in a given society has significantly 
increased, and the existing sentencing scheme seems unable to tamp it down, we 
might be justified in bumping sentences up overall to see if doing so would induce 
more compliance with the law.  Of course, by the same token, if the existing 
scheme seems too costly and damaging to offenders, and we are convinced that 
reducing sentences overall would be unlikely to produce a significant uptick in 
offending, then we might move the anchoring points down and thereby opt for a 
milder scheme (so long as doing so could not reasonably be seen as denigrating 
victim interests).  Third, and most controversially, I am increasingly persuaded that 
most mala prohibita are punished not to inflict proportional penal harms on 
offenders—there might, after all, be no victims of such offenses—but to deter their 
commission.  This means that sanctions for such offenses must be designed so that 
they are sufficient to deter, yet not so costly or harmful as to outweigh their 
benefits.  With male in se, there are victims, or would-be victims, and so 
considerations of proportional penal harm are relevant to determining the sentences 
for such offenses.  The question we now turn to is whether there should be 
distinctive sentence ranges for “successful” and “unsuccessful” attempts to commit 
prohibited harmful acts.   
 
III. PUNISHING FAILED ATTEMPTS 
 
Again, in addition to the harm wrought by agents whose actions fall under the 
purview of the criminal law, retributive proportionality analysis standardly requires 
the level of offender culpability to be taken into account.  When harm is caused by 
an agent in the complete absence of culpability, as with accidental harms, then 
legal punishment, with its censure and hard treatment, is inappropriate.  But one 
can easily imagine that at some earlier point in human history, the impulse to 
return harm for harm might have led our ancestors to strike back vengefully at 
accidental harmers.  Reduced or absent culpability, as a crucial qualifying factor in 
the infliction of legal punishment, might be a relative latecomer to the punitive 
stage.
24
  Moreover, harmers who inflict injuries or death non-culpably often are 
plagued by feelings of guilt afterwards, even if such feelings are entirely irrational 
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given the circumstances of the harm.
25
  This suggests how much harm and the 
avoidance of harm matter to us.  
Failed attempters who do no harm are at the other end of the spectrum from 
accidental harmers.  Their actions are highly culpable but produce no harm.  
Initially, given my account of the role of retributive proportionality in a theory of 
sentencing, the puzzle might seem to be why we punish them at all.  Why not 
adopt the maxim “no harm, no foul?”  Yet it is not only actually causing harm that 
we seek to discourage and punish, but risking it (and in the cases under 
consideration, risking grave harm at a high degree of probability).  Negative 
retributivism, which incorporates a crime reduction role for legal punishment, can 
accommodate this point more easily than can positive retributivism.  It might be 
claimed that agents who risk or attempt harm are, nonetheless, highly culpable and 
so deserving of punishment.  Perhaps, though as we shall see, such an account 
depends on a controversial construal of the notion of “culpability.”  
This brings us to the crux of my argument concerning the punishment of 
failed attempts.  If retributive hard treatment is premised, as I believe it is, on the 
notion that we must key penal harms to victim harms, it would appear that such a 
proportionate harm principle is not activated when there are no victim harms.  The 
victims in such cases suffer “close calls,” but might suffer little real harm.  
Granted, they might be traumatized by their close calls, but this will, at most, 
justify only the infliction of relatively mild penal harms on those who sought to 
harm them.  Simply put, in cases of failed attempts, there is nothing, or perhaps 
very little, for retributive hard treatment to equalize.  My sense is that we punish 
acts that attempt or risk harm in order to prevent them.  Yet, as we have seen, 
crime reduction can be achieved in such cases without sanctions that punish failed 
attempters as harshly as we punish successful ones.
26
  Yes, we want to discourage 
and perhaps incapacitate those who attempt murder yet who fail to produce any 
harm, but we probably do not need to assign them prison sentences comparable to 
those of successful murderers to accomplish these penal aims.  
Conversely, when victims are harmed, the retributive proportionate harm 
principle is fully activated.  Hence, even if on crime reduction grounds it might not 
make any sense to punish successful and failed attempters differently—as theorists 
on both sides of the objectivist/subjectivist divide have sometimes argued—the 
presence of the proportionate harm principle requires us to inflict substantial penal 
harms on offenders who have taken everything from their victims.
27
   
One way in which to drive home the intuition on which my account is based is 
to consider what it would be like to punish failed attempts equivalently with 
successful ones.  Suppose that we believed that highly culpable murderers 
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warranted the death penalty.  Subjectivists then would be committed, it seems, to 
assigning it to failed attempters.  This would mean that after many years of the 
inevitable appeals of the sentence, the failed attempter would be escorted to the 
execution chamber.  Among the observers might be his intended but very-much-
alive victim.  Surely there is something wrong with this picture.  It would not help 
much to imagine that attempted murderers should be subjected to sentences of life 
without parole, like their successful murdering counterparts, or even to very long 
prison sentences.  We would still have the specter of the attempter languishing for 
the rest of her life in prison, or for most of it, while her intended victim enjoyed a 
long, normal life.  On a version of negative retributivism that incorporates a 
principle of imposing proportionate penal harms for culpably inflicted victim 
harms, punishing failed attempts as we punish successful ones seems paradoxical.  
What makes sense is accepting a compromise: we should punish failed attempters 
less than successful ones, although enough, presumably, to censure their 
wrongdoing and strongly discourage it.    
The counter-intuitive nature of subjectivism can be shown in another way.  
Again, subjectivists hold that failed homicide attempts ought to be punished 
equivalently with successful ones when all other relevant sentencing features are 
held constant.  This means, it would seem, that subjectivists are also committed to 
punishing failed homicide attempts more than aggravated assaults, at least on the 
assumption that homicide is a more serious crime than aggravated assault.  Some 
aggravated assaults leave victims profoundly and permanently disabled.  Assume 
that in some such cases, the perpetrators were not intending to kill their victims, 
only injure them badly.  Subjectivists would have to support less punishment for 
such vicious maulers than for those who attempt but entirely fail to kill persons.  
Yet it seems odd to punish more harshly someone who inflicts little or no harm on 
an intended victim, as some failed attempts do, than someone who intentionally 
inflicts debilitating, lifelong injuries on a victim.  Yet it is not apparent how 
subjectivists, who downplay the role of harm in sentencing, can avoid this 
implication.       
It might be objected that, in cases of failed attempts, as in cases of successful 
ones, we ought to employ legal punishment to retributively stand for or validate the 
interests of victims.
28
  Those who were the intended objects of failed attempters’ 
murderous intentions might complain bitterly if the state imposed legal sanctions 
on attempters that amounted to little more than proverbial slaps on their wrists.  
“Look what almost happened to me,” they might protest.  Does this not show that 
the proportionate harm principle ought to be activated by failed attempts?  I do not 
believe that it does.  First, such an essentially communicative version of 
retributivism struggles to explain hard treatment.  On retributive accounts, legal 
punishment does communicate, but it does so through the imposition of 
                                                                                                                                      
28  This objection depends on something like Jean Hampton’s account of retributive 
punishment.  Hampton, supra note 10, at 402.  
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proportionate penal harm on offenders.  The difficulty is explaining why legal 
punishment should inflict penal harms when victims suffer no harm.  Second, my 
position is not that failed attempters should not be punished at all, only that they 
should not be punished equivalently with actual murderers.  Sanctions aimed at 
deterrence or incapacitation will still censure offenders and validate the interests of 
their victims.  But dead victims require the imposition of considerably more 
censuring hard treatment on offending agents, for such victims have not “almost” 
lost everything.  They have, in fact, lost everything.   
Importantly, the absence of harm, and with it the non-activation of the 
retributive proportionate harm principle, better explains why we punish failed 
attempters differently from successful ones than do the appeals by many 
objectivists to our emotional reactions to the two kinds of attempts.  One problem 
with such appeals is that it is easy to imagine cases in which the public’s emotional 
reactions to failed attempts might work to support punishments equivalent to or 
greater than those for successful ones.  Much might depend on the popularity of 
the targeted victim or the unpopularity of the unsuccessful attempter.  Racial, 
ethnic, gender, or class prejudices might influence the emotional reactions of the 
public, or the largest or most powerful segments of it, producing harsher sentences 
for some failed attempters than others.  Also, objectivist appeals to the relief that 
failed attempters ought to experience when their intended targets emerge unscathed 
likewise seems a shaky ground for such discounts when failed attempters do not, in 
fact, react as they should.  Some failed attempters will not feel relief; they will be 
chagrined that their attempts miscarried and vow to renew them should they ever 
get the chance.  It is hard to see how failed attempters of that kind would be 
entitled to any sentencing discount based on their emotional reactions to their 
failures.  
Peter Westen has recently defended a different objectivist account, which he 
attributes to Plato.
29
  According to Westen’s account, failed attempters do not 
deserve reduced sentences but might be granted them as a matter of virtue or 
supererogation.
30
  Because failed attempters do not actually harm their intended 
victims, we feel somewhat more kindly toward them than we do toward successful 
ones.  Subjectivists are apt to regard such charitable impulses as misguided.  I 
worry that such virtuous reactions might manifest only in some cases of failed 
attempts, not all of them.
31
  Again, whether or not the public feels more kindly 
toward failed attempters than successful ones will likely depend on the identity of 
their intended targets or of the attempter.  
On my account, lesser sentences for failed attempters do not depend on the 
public’s or offenders’ emotional reactions to their crimes.  Instead, they depend on 
the absence of victim harm and thus the non-activation of the retributive 
                                                                                                                                      
29  Westen, supra note 2, at 314–18. 
30  Westen, supra note 2, at 317. 
31  Westen, supra note 2, at 318. 
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proportionate harm principle according to which penal harms must be 
proportionate with victim harms.  Specifically, those who try to kill others but 
entirely fail to do so should be charged with attempted homicide and punished less 
than their successful homicidal counterparts.  
 
IV. FURTHER OBJECTION AND REPLIES 
 
Numerous objections to the account I have defended can be anticipated.  One 
of them begins by reminding us that retributive accounts of sentencing are 
supposed to proportion legal punishment to the ill-deserts of offenders.  The more 
deserving of legal punishment offenders are, the more they should be punished.  
Yet successful and failed attempters are equally deserving: both have malevolent 
(and illegal) purposes and both act intentionally to set into motion causal chains 
that they have reason to believe will eventuate in harm.
32
  Thus, it will be argued, 
even a negative retributivist account, such as my own, should, presumptively at 
least, insist on the equal punishment of the equally culpable.  
I contend that the account of retributivism implicit in this criticism is too 
focused on culpability as a sentencing factor in ways that sleight the importance of 
harm.  Again, on retributive approaches to sentencing, legal sanctions should be 
keyed to victim harm; culpability is then brought in as a qualifier, one that can, in 
some cases, make legal punishment inappropriate though agents have caused grave 
harm.  Generally speaking, culpability has to do with the extent to which a harm-
causing agent exercises control over producing the harm.
33
  Deliberate harmers 
exercise more control than do reckless or negligent harmers.  Deliberate harmers 
attempt to see to it that the necessary and sufficient conditions of harm production 
are satisfied.  Reckless or negligent harmers simply raise the risks that others will 
suffer setbacks to their interests, with the former doing so to a greater extent or 
with greater indifference than the latter.  Notice this also: if culpability in this 
narrow sense determined sentences, then all deliberate harmers would have to be 
punished similarly, regardless of the harms they inflicted, for all of them exercised 
the same amount of control over whatever harms they produced.  The same would 
be true for all reckless harmers.  This suggests that it must be harm of different 
kinds and degrees that is the key to determining sentences on a retributive account.  
Once sentence ranges are set with regard to the kinds and degrees of harm, with 
deliberate causation of harm taken as the starting point, those who harm recklessly 
or perhaps negligently then receive discounts in light of their reduced control over 
the harmful consequences of their acts.  
In response, it might be claimed that there is a straightforward sense in which 
those who attempt murder are more culpable than those who attempt assault or 
                                                                                                                                      
32  See, e.g., Ashworth, supra note 1, at 736–37; Kadish, supra note 1, at 686–95; ALEXANDER 
& FERZAN, supra note 1, at 172–78. 
33  See HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 87–88 (1979). 
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theft and should be punished accordingly.  I concede that sometimes the word 
“culpability” is used in this way.  When it is, it contains implicit reference to the 
harms that the agents in question were setting out to produce.  I would also 
concede that, prospectively, successful and failed murder attempters are “equally 
culpable” or blameworthy.  They both set about deliberately attempting to produce 
grave harm.  The problem is that, on a retributive approach, legal punishment is 
not determined prospectively but retrospectively.  To determine what punishment 
an offender is due, we should not focus only on what he set out to do but what he 
actually did.  Failed attempters did not produce the harms they set out to produce.  
Therefore, we do not need to impose proportionate penal harms on them in order to 
do justice to the harms done to their victims’ lives and interests—victims who, 
after all, have emerged largely if not entirely unscathed.  
It might be objected that the theory of sentencing on which my analysis 
depends seems awkward in cases in which significant harm is wrought by 
offenders who are less than fully culpable.  Specifically, if we punish those who 
recklessly harm less than those who purposefully do so, how does this serve to 
impose penal losses on offenders that are proportionate with the losses suffered by 
their victims?  It would seem that having culpability as an element in retributive 
sentencing is somewhat at cross purposes with giving victim harm its full and 
proper due.  Further, we do not punish those who harm others if they do so 
accidentally; neither do we usually punish those who inflict harm negligently.  
Instead, we generally prefer to let the victims of negligently-inflicted harms 
attempt to recover compensation through tort suits.  Culpability up to a certain 
level—usually the level of recklessness—is a necessary condition of appropriate 
liability to legal punishment.  Does this not suggest that culpability plays a more 
central role in sentencing than my emphasis on harm allows? 
There is no use denying that, on my account, crimes that recklessly inflict 
harm should be punished less than crimes that purposefully inflict it.  Of course, 
those who recklessly harm will still be punished and the severity of their 
punishment should reflect the gravity of the harms their actions produced.  Such 
punishment therefore will be proportionate, even if it will not be roughly 
equalizing in the ways that retributive hard treatment is supposed to be.  Victims 
(or their loved ones) might feel somewhat cheated or disappointed by this, but it is 
vital to point out that those who inflicted the harms imposed unjustified risks of 
harm but did not purposefully set out to harm.  With purposeful harming, no 
reduced culpability discount should be applied and thus stronger condemnation in 
the form of more punishment is in order.  Also, individuals who have been harmed 
through the recklessness of others can still pursue civil remedies in the attempt to 
force harm-causing agents to compensate them.  
Granted, in the absence of culpability, or sufficient culpability, no punishment 
of harm-causers is appropriate, and this is true even if victims have been caused 
grave harm.  Yet this does not show that culpability is more central to determining 
appropriate legal punishment than my position acknowledges.  True, a harm-
causing agent’s conduct must be culpable up to a certain level to qualify for legal 
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punishment.  But again, it is the harm done or risked by agents that is the starting 
point for determining their legal punishment.  Culpability alone is nearly useless in 
determining the extent to which crimes are to be punished.  This is hardly 
surprising given that questions about the extent to which harm was caused 
purposefully, recklessly, or negligently are pertinent to a wide range of criminal 
offenses that threaten harm in different ways and to different degrees and so must 
be punished differently.  
Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan have recently challenged objectivists, 
concocting several ingenious analogies that they believe show the irrelevance of 
harm to the punishment of attempts.
34
  In the most successful of their analogies, the 
leaders of a Satanic cult set up a sort of Russian Roulette which involves inviting 
cult initiates to each take a turn shooting a rifle through a small aperture at some 
innocent victim who is strapped to a chair.  The catch is that all of the initiates, 
save one, will be shooting blanks.  Only one of them will do the actual killing.  
Alexander and Ferzan stipulate that the initiates are not acting in concert; each acts 
independently in shooting the rifle, though each knows that there is a chance that it 
contains a live round that might kill the person strapped to the chair.  At the 
conclusion of the initiation ritual, the victim is dead.  Suppose that the initiates are 
arrested, charged, and punished for what they did.  Alexander and Ferzan argue 
that the only sensible thing to do would be to charge and punish them all alike.  
They all equally imposed a grave risk of death and, moreover, did so believing that 
they might be unleashing a causal chain that could produce the victim’s death.  The 
fact that only one of them actually caused the harm is, they argue, irrelevant for the 
purposes of determining their respective punishments. 
Though intriguing, I do not think that Alexander and Ferzan’s analogy is 
convincing.  The analogy involves a case of unreasonably risking grave harm, as 
opposed to intentionally attempting to inflict it.  Alexander and Ferzan would 
presumably argue that this does not matter, since it is not the level of culpability of 
the agents on which we are meant to focus, but the (alleged) irrelevance of the 
harm in determining the punishment that each should be assigned.  I would agree 
that if the authorities are unable to determine which of the shooters had the live 
round, then they should all be charged and punished similarly.  With what they 
should be charged is a bit less clear.  The answer might depend on what the 
participants knew or reasonably believed about the outcome of the ritual.  In 
particular, did each of them know or reasonably believe that, at the end of the 
                                                                                                                                      
34  ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 1, at 172–78.  Alexander and Ferzan’s second analogy, 
involving two children who, after being admonished not to risk slight harms, do so with the result that 
only one of them produces the harm, seems to me less instructive.  Our intuitions about what it shows 
are apt to be clouded by the differences between the parent/child relationship and the state/citizen 
one.  Also, the triviality of the harm makes it harder to determine whether the two children ought to 
be punished differently.  Finally, it is unclear from the analogy whether they act separately or in 
concert in defying the parent’s commands.  This will make a difference to how we evaluate their 
liability to parental punishment.  
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ritual, one of them will have fired a live round thereby gravely endangering the 
person in the chair?  Or did they know or reasonably believe only that each of them 
was firing a rifle that might contain a live round but that death or grave injury to 
the person in the chair was not inevitable, as it were?  In the former case, charges 
of reckless homicide might be appropriate; in the latter case, charges of reckless 
endangerment might seem more defensible.  Alexander and Ferzan stipulate that 
the shooters are not acting “in concert,” but it is unclear what they do or do not 
know about the likely outcome of the ritual.  In any event, their reasoning seems 
persuasive if the authorities cannot determine who, in fact, fired the live round.   
However, what if the authorities could discern which of the initiates fired the 
live round?  Suppose that just as the shooter who happened to have the live round 
was pulling the trigger and killing the victim, the police arrive on the scene.  
Having witnessed the killing, the police arrest the shooter and turn the case over to 
the prosecutor, who charges the shooter with homicide.  Suppose also that as the 
police investigation continues, they discover that a number of other individuals 
took shots at the victim believing that they were shooting live rounds, although 
none of them were actually doing so.  The police then arrest the other initiates as 
well and turn their cases over to the prosecutor.  The question is with what should 
the prosecutor charge them.  Homicide?  That might make sense if they were 
acting in concert and they each believed that, at the conclusion of the initiation 
ritual, it was nearly certain that the victim would be dead.  Yet if each of them 
believed only that there was a chance she was shooting a live round and it was 
unclear to each of them whether anyone actually had one, then charging them with 
reckless endangerment might seem more appropriate.  In effect, the non-lethal 
shooters would be like drunk drivers who luckily avoid hitting and killing anyone.  
Further, once apprised of the nature of the ritual, the prosecutor might revise the 
charges against the live shooter who actually killed the victim down to something 
like reckless homicide.  The question is whether the prosecutor would be acting 
irrationally in so distinguishing between the live shooter and the other initiates.  
Alexander and Ferzan would have us believe so (and, no doubt, the live shooter’s 
attorney would agree with them).  After all, each of the participants did the same 
thing with the same belief that she was risking killing the victim.  
I am not persuaded that the prosecutor would act unreasonably in charging the 
live shooter differently from the other initiates.  If pressed, the prosecutor might 
argue that the live shooter did something different—she actually killed the victim.  
The other initiates merely risked grave harm.  Granted, the other initiates were 
lucky, but there is nothing obviously unfair about punishing more stoutly someone 
who knowingly risks legally prohibited harm and then, unluckily, causes it.  To be 
clear, my argument is not one to the effect that since most legal jurisdictions 
punish harm-causers more than harm-riskers, therefore the former are on notice, so 
to speak, that they will receive harsher punishment.  Such an argument would beg 
the question against subjectivists like Alexander and Ferzan; they are claiming that 
such legal practices, though ubiquitous, are unjustified.  Instead, my argument is 
that harm to victims changes things; in response to it, legal punishment must be 
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tailored to inflict proportionate penal harms on offenders.  Moreover, harm-riskers 
can and should be put on notice that this is true; if the harms they risk eventuate, 
then they can hardly complain of unfairness, especially if they are punished 
proportionally with the gravity of the harms they inflict.  True, the live shooter in 
the Satanic ritual case just got unlucky compared with her initiate counterparts.  
But her unluckiness produced a victim and this activates the proportionate harm 
principle, just as the drunk driver who kills someone gets unlucky and has to pay a 
stiffer punitive price.
35
 
If this seems unconvincing, then consider a modified version of the analogy in 
which each of the shooters is told by the cult leaders that they might be shooting a 
live round when, in fact, none of them actually is.  After all, being prepared to 
shoot what he believes to be a live round might suffice to convince the cult leaders 
of an initiate’s worthiness for membership.  If the ritual was discovered by the 
authorities, would Alexander and Ferzan have the authorities charge the initiates 
with reckless endangerment, or worse, reckless homicide?  All who pulled the 
trigger engaged in an act which they believed could result in the death of the 
targeted person.  In other words, all of them had a culpable state of mind and acted 
to initiate what he or she believed to be an uncontrollable casual chain.  If harm 
does not matter, as Alexander and Ferzan contend, then I do not see how they can 
avoid drawing the conclusion that all of the impossible shooters are “guilty” of 
reckless homicide.  After all, each of them acted intentionally in a way that persons 
who recklessly endanger others and wind up killing them act.  Yet such a 
conclusion surely strains credibility.  
The preceding case is an instance of what are known as “impossible 
attempts.”  In impossible attempts, offending agents have malevolent intentions, 
combined with mistaken beliefs about the efficacy of the means they employ to 
effectuate them.  The mistaken beliefs can range from the bizarre—persons who 
believe that voodoo can be employed to torture those whom they despise and wish 
to harm—to the more mundane—persons who intend to kill their spouses purchase 
baking powder from undercover police officers, believing it to be cyanide, which is 
then used in “poisoning” attempts.  Theorists who elevate culpability over harm 
would seem to have a difficult time explaining why we should not punish agents 
who impossibly attempt homicide exactly like those who fully achieve it.  Indeed, 
many subjectivists argue that the two kinds of agents should be punished the 
same.
36
  Yet this seems an unattractive position to defend, given that impossible 
attempters not only do no harm but could not do so, given their mistaken beliefs.  
It does not follow that we should do nothing with or to impossible attempters.  
How we should react to them might depend on the origins of their mistaken 
                                                                                                                                      
35  The rite’s organizers should be charged with deliberate homicide, at least on the 
supposition that they set up the rite knowing that it would produce the killing of the victim.  They did 
more than recklessly cause a death; they intentionally caused it. 
36  ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 1, at 194–95; Ashworth, supra note 1, at 758–59. 
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beliefs.  Those who, for instance, incompetently assemble bombs that they then try 
to detonate might be punished like other attempters who fail due to factors beyond 
their control.  After all, it is not to the credit of incompetent bombers that they 
failed to blow up their intended targets, any more than it is to snipers who miss 
their targets because the wind blows their bullets off target.  Others who attempt 
homicide, such as deluded agents who believe that nerf guns are deadly weapons, 
might best be dealt with through civil commitment proceedings.   
It might be thought that subjectivists can evade the problem posed by 
impossible attempts by adopting some form of rationality constraint on the beliefs 
that render agents liable to full legal punishment.  Again, subjectivists typically 
argue that it is what homicidal agents believe and intend that renders them 
culpable, not whether their beliefs are true or otherwise grounded in reality.
37
  It is 
this feature of their view that opens them up to the objection that deluded or utterly 
mistaken homicidal agents must be punished equivalently to otherwise lucid 
homicidal agents.  But perhaps subjectivists can avoid such a position by insisting 
that, in order to be liable to full legal punishment, homicidal agents’ beliefs must 
be “minimally rational.”  Such a constraint might enable them to avoid holding that 
voodoo and nerf gun “killers” ought to be punished like real killers.   
Setting to one side the difficulties with specifying the relevant constraint more 
precisely, the problem is that it will not enable subjectivists to argue against the 
full legal punishment of other impossible attempters.  The agent who believes that 
she is shooting real bullets at her hated rival, instead of blanks, might well have 
beliefs that are “minimally rational,” as might the agent who believes that he is 
purchasing cyanide from reputable dealers, rather than undercover police officers.  
Blanks might look just like real bullets such that only those more knowledgeable 
about weapons and ammunition can tell the difference.  Likewise, the prospective 
cyanide killer might have little reason to doubt the veracity of the agents who sell 
him the baking soda.  Again, my position is not that these impossible attempters 
should not be punished, only that it is far from clear that they ought to be punished 
the same as actual murderers.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Many penal theorists will remain skeptical about the retributive element in my 
account of sentencing, regarding it as little more than what Jean Hampton once 
termed a “bite back” response.38  It might be useful to note that one can embrace it 
without endorsing lex talionis, capital punishment, or many of the other harsh and 
                                                                                                                                      
37  See Ashworth, supra note 1, at 757; ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 1, at 194–95. 
38  Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment, and Hatred, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 35, 54 
(Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988). 
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lengthy forms of punishment employed in countries like the United States.
39
  I 
believe that it is also fair to say that some existing sentencing schemes exceed 
retributive upper limits by failing to take into account the myriad and sometimes 
subtle ways in which legal punishment diminishes offenders’ lives.  Nevertheless, 
for those prepared to do entirely without a proportionate penal harm principle in a 
theory of sentencing, then little that I have said in the preceding pages will 
convince them that failed attempters ought to be punished less than their successful 
counterparts. Yet foregoing proportionality constraints in an account of sentencing, 
or including them but leaving them unexplained, seem to be unattractive options.  
In fact, most subjectivists appear to assume some version or other in their analyses 
of the punishment of failed and successful attempts.  This is shown by their 
repeated assertions that successful and failed attempters deserve the same 
punishment. 
                                                                                                                                      
39  For more on this, see Richard L. Lippke, Anchoring the Sentencing Scale: A Modest 
Proposal, 16 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 463 (2012). 
